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ABSTRACT: One of the philosophical uses of Dedekind’s categoricity theorem for Peano 
Arithmetic is to provide support for semantic realism. To this end, the logical framework 
in which the proof of the theorem is conducted becomes highly significant. I examine 
different proposals regarding these logical frameworks and focus on the philosophical 
benefits of adopting open-ended schemas in contrast to second order logic as the logical 
medium of the proof. I investigate Pederson and Rossberg’s critique of the ontological 
advantages of open-ended arithmetic when it comes to establishing the categoricity of 
Peano Arithmetic and show that the critique is highly problematic. I argue that 
Pederson and Rossberg’s ontological criterion deliver the bizarre result that certain first 
order subsystems of Peano Arithmetic have a second order ontology. As a consequence, 
the application of the ontological criterion proposed by Pederson and Rossberg assigns a 
certain type of ontology to a theory, and a different, richer, ontology to one of its sub-
theories.   
KEYWORDS: Dedekind’s categoricity theorem, categoricity arguments, semantic 
completeness, semantic realism, open-ended schemas, second order logic, Peano 
Arithmetic, Quine’s ontological criterion  
 
Categoricity vs. Completeness 
Let’s begin by defining the two concepts that I will investigate in this section. 
With respect to this goal we presuppose that a formal language ℒ, a recursive 
formal system S = {A, F, Ax, R}1 with a semantic provided in the standard way 
have been specified. In this framework, crucial logical notions can be defined 
mathematically: what is a deduction of a sentence φ from a set Γ of sentences (Γ├ 
φ), what it means for a structure M to be a model of a sentence φ (M ⊨ φ) - in 
which case we say that φ is true in M - or of a set Γ of sentences (M ⊨ Γ), and 
what it means for a sentence φ to be the semantic consequence of a set Γ of 
sentences (Γ ⊨ φ).  
Definition 1. A theory T is categorical if any two models Mi and Mj of T are   
isomorphic, Mi ≅Mj.  
                                                                
1 A is the alphabet of ℒ, F is the set of the formulae expressed in ℒ, Ax is the set of certain 
formulae taken as axioms and R is the set of rules of derivation. 
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Definition 2. A recursive formal system S (with a rigorously defined deduction 
relation ├) is complete (with respect to the consequence relation ⊨) if 
for all sets of sentences Γ and sentences φ, if Γ ⊨ φ, then Γ├ φ. 
There is a tension between the two notions visible in the case of second 
order Peano Arithmetic, PA2: PA2 is categorical, which makes its consequence 
relation ⊨2 incomplete, as opposed to first order Peano Arithmetic, PA, which 
isn’t categorical, but the first order consequence relation ⊨ is complete. The 
argument for the former is straightforward: PA2’s (intended) model is ℕ, so from 
the fact that PA2 is categorical, it follows that all models of PA2 are isomorphic to 
ℕ. Let φ be any sentence which is true in ℕ; the categoricity of PA2 assures that 
PA2 ⊨2 φ, i.e. all models of PA2 are models of φ. Since φ is an arbitrary true 
sentence of ℕ, it can be the canonical Gödel sentence G2 (or Rosser sentence R2). 
By Gödel’s incompleteness theorem, PA2⊬ G2, (or if one prefers working with the 
Rosser sentence, PA2⊬ R2) although, as argued, PA2 ⊨2 G2, (or PA2⊬ R2) so the 
consequence relation ⊨2 is not complete in the sense of definition 2.  
For reasons that we are not going to expose and investigate here, 
completeness became the philosophically dominant notion among the two so 
much that the contributions of early authors who actively participated in the 
development of modern logic and mathematics were interpreted through this 
conceptual bias. The predominance of completeness over categoricity combined 
with a poor knowledge of Frege’s work led to a crude misinterpretation of his 
philosophical project. Kneale, for example, in his 1956 paper, “Gottlob Frege and 
Mathematical Logic,”2 interprets Frege’s philosophical goal as providing a 
complete formal system capable to represent and characterize mathematical 
theories such as Peano Arithmetic or set theory. And by complete, Kneale 
understands what is conveyed by definition 2, as can easily be inferred from his 
conclusion that Frege’s project was undermined by Gödel’s incompleteness 
theorem. 
Since Kneale’s paper, categoricity gained momentum on at least two aspects. 
First, it was recuperated philosophically to the degree that debates regarding its 
significance not only are on-going, but occupy a crucial part of today’s philosophy 
of mathematics, and the literature is growing. Second, intensive exegetical studies 
have thrown a new light on the status and relation of categoricity with other 
logical and mathematical notions in the works of Dedekind, Veblen, Fraenkel, 
Frege, Carnap, Tarski and Hilbert, to name a few.  
                                                                
2 William Kneale, “Gottlob Frege and Mathematical Logic,” The Revolution in Philosophy 
(London: Macmillan, 1956), 26–40.  
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Let us remark in passing that the philosophical ascendance of categoricity 
gained momentum with Georg Kreisel’s 1972 article, “Informal Rigor and 
Completeness Proofs,”3 touching on the uses of categoricity for sustaining certain 
realist4 theses in the philosophy of mathematics. Since Kreisel’s paper various 
categoricity arguments have been produced for sustaining substantial 
philosophical theses.   
In what follows, I will focus on one such philosophical use of categoricity 
that gives thrust to semantic realism. In order to explain the mechanism by which 
categoricity provides support for semantic realism I will present and explain the 
relation between categoricity and semantic completeness.  
Categoricity and Semantic Completeness 
There are several equivalent definitions of semantic completeness. The following 
seems to be quite intuitive and common: 
Definition 3: A theory T is semantically complete if either T ⊨ φ or T ⊨¬ φ, for 
all sentences φ.  
This definition is equivalent to: 
Definition 4: A theory T is semantically complete if for all T-models Mi, Mj and 
sentences φ, Mi ⊨ φ implies Mj ⊨ φ.  
Proposition 1: Definition 3 is equivalent to definition 4.  
Proof (sketch): 3 implies 4. Assume that either T ⊨ φ or T ⊨¬ φ, and suppose that 
Mi ⊨ φ. Now, if it were the case that Mj ⊨¬φ, then the theory T would 
have two models Mi, Mj such that Mi ⊨φ and Mj ⊨¬φ, which 
contradicts the assumption that either T ⊨ φ or T ⊨¬ φ, i.e. all models 
of T satisfies φ or all models of T satisfies ¬ φ.  
4 implies 3. Assume that for all T-models Mi, Mj and sentences φ, Mi ⊨ 
φ implies Mj ⊨ φ. If it isn’t the case that either T ⊨ φ or T ⊨¬ φ, then 
there are T- models M1, M2 such that M1 ⊨ φ and M2 ⊨¬ φ which 
would contradict the assumption that for all T-models Mi ⊨ φ implies 
Mj ⊨ φ. 
                                                                
3 Georg Kreisel, “Informal Rigor and Completeness Proofs,” in Problems in the Philosophy of 
Mathematics, ed. Imre Lakatos (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1972): 138–157.  
4 For example the thesis that every mathematical sentence expressed in the language of a non-
algebraic theory has a determinate truth value.  
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Steve Awodey and Erich Reck’s article, “Completeness and Categoricity. 
Part I: Nineteenth-century Axiomatics to Twentieth-century Metalogic,”5 testifies, 
the early authors who developed formal axiomatic systems for significant areas of 
mathematics such as arithmetic, geometry and analysis 1) meant primarily by 
‘completeness’ what we call categoricity, 2) considered that the philosophical 
significance of categoricity consists in proving the completeness of the 
axiomatization of a structure, regarding it as marker for the theory’s successful 
axiomatization, and 3) took semantic completeness to follow immediately form 
categoricity, without feeling the need for a proof of this fact or analyzing the 
relations between completeness, categoricity, and semantic completeness.   
Also, semantic completeness is repeatedly recognized to be a direct consequence 
of categoricity, although no proof of that fact is ever given; and sometimes the 
two notions are conflated, or apparently treated as equivalent. Finally, it is only 
around 1904-1906 that we have found the first expression of a suspicion, in some 
asides of Veblen’s, that neither categoricity nor semantic completeness may need 
to coincide with deductive or logical completeness, or more generally that the 
deductive consequence relation may differ from its semantic counterpart.6 
Now, for theories expressed in first order logic,7 but also in higher order 
logic,8 we can prove that categoricity implies semantic completeness. In order to 
sketch the proof in the first order case, we introduce a definition and state without 
proof a theorem (the isomorphism theorem): 
Definition 3: Two models Mi and Mj are elementary equivalent, Mi ≡ Mj, if for all 
sentences φ, Mi ⊨ φ if and only if Mj ⊨ φ. 
Theorem 1 (the isomorphism theorem): If Mi ≅ Mj, then Mi ≡ Mj. 
Proof: by induction on the complexity of formulas and terms.  
Proposition 2: If a first order theory T is categorical, then it is semantically 
complete.  
Proof (sketch): Suppose a first order theory T is categorical. Assume that Mi ⊨ φ, 
for some T-model Mi. Now, from the assumption that T is categorical it 
follows that Mi ≅ Mj, for all T-models Mj, which, from the isomorphism 
                                                                
5 Steve Awodey and Erich Reck, “Completeness and Categoricity. Part I: Nineteenth-Century 
Axiomatics to Twentieth-century Metalogic,” History and Philosophy of Logic 23, 1 (2002): 1–
30. 
6 Awodey and Reck, “Completeness and Categoricity, Part I,” 19.  
7 Shortened as first order theories from now on. 
8 For a (sketched) proof of the implication in higher order logic, see the proof of Proposition 2 in 
Steve Awodey and Erich Reck, “Completeness and Categoricity, Part II: Twentieth-Century 
Metalogic to Twenty-first-Century Semantics,” History and Philosophy of Logic 23, 2 (2002), 83.  
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theorem, further implies that Mj ⊨ φ. By definition 4 T is semantically 
complete.  
An interesting problem is whether the converse of proposition 2 holds. In 
the case of first order logic, the answer is negative; it is an easy consequence of the 
Löwenheim–Skolem theorems that no semantically complete first order theories 
with models that have infinite domains are categorical. The answer is negative too 
for theories with an infinite set of axioms formulated in higher order logic. 
Howerver, Carnap9 conjectured that in the case of theories expressed in higher 
order logic with a finite set of axioms, semantic completeness implies categoricity. 
Although there are no known counter-examples to the implication from the 
semantic completeness to the categoricity in the case of such theories and several 
conditions10 which enable the implication have been discerned, Carnap’s 
conjecture remains unanswered.   
In what follows I will discuss the use of categoricity as an argument for 
semantic realism, examine different proposals regarding the logical frameworks in 
which to prove the categoricity theorem for Peano Arithmetic, focusing on the 
open-ended arithmetic, investigate a critique of the ontological benefits of 
adopting open-ended arithmetic and show that the critique is highly 
problematic.11 
Categoricity and Semantic Realism 
The core of semantic realism consists in the belief that the sentences (expressed in 
the languages) of certain mathematical theories have objective, and determinate 
truth values. I will call this belief the truth value determinacy thesis (TVD). The 
use of the categoricity of a theory T as an argument for the determinacy of the 
truth values of all the sentences φ expressed in the language of T has been 
vigorously championed by Vann McGee.12 Let us develop his argument a little bit. 
A commitment to a literal reading of mathematical sentences, consistent with a 
realist approach of mathematics, seems to be at odds with an irreparable form of 
reference inscrutability for singular terms. Without diving too much into history, 
we can trace the argument for the referential inscrutability of mathematical 
                                                                
9 For details see Steve Awodey and A. W. Carus, “Carnap, Completeness, and Categoricity: The 
Gabelbarkeitssatz of 1928,” Erkenntnis 54, 2 (2001): 145–172. 
10 Such conditions include the definability of the model, or that the model of such a theory has 
no proper submodels etc. 
11 Which doesn’t mean that the author is committed to the position that it is critiqued.  




singular terms to the seminal paper of Paul Benacerraf, “What Numbers Could Not 
Be.”13 Benacerraf begins by noting that in a set-theoretical framework one can 
construct the natural numbers system in two equivalent but incompatible ways. 
The popular, if not the standard construction among set theorists, involves 
representing 0 as Ø, and defining the successor function sN as sN(x) = x ∪ {x}. 
Proceeding in this manner we obtain the following equalities: 0 = Ø, 1 = {0} = {Ø}, 
2 = {0, 1} = {Ø, {Ø}}, 3 = {0, 1, 2} = {Ø, {Ø}, {Ø, {Ø}}} and so on. As can be easily 
seen, in this construction each natural number n is identified with the set of all its 
predecessors, and, as a perk, the set corresponding to each number n contains n 
elements.14 Next, we define NN to be the smallest set containing 0 and closed 
under the successor function sN. It can be routinely verified that the structure <NN, 
0, sN>, thus specified, is a model of a Peano system. The recipe for this particular 
construction was proposed by von Neumann, and the sets identified as natural 
numbers are called von Neumann ordinals.  
An alternative set-theoretic construction of the natural numbers was 
proposed by Ernest Zermelo; it begins with the same representation of the number 
0 as Ø, but defines the successor function sZ(x) = {x}; so, in the zermelian 
construction, 1 = {Ø} (which is identical with its counterpart in von Neumann 
construction), 2 = {{Ø}}, 3 = {{{Ø}}} and so on. As in the case above, we define NZ to 
be the smallest set containing 0 and closed under the successor function sZ and 
leave to readers to convince themselves that the structure <NZ, 0, sZ>, thus 
specified, is a model of a Peano system.  
Now, the two structures are elementary equivalent although referentially 
different: the set corresponding to 2 in NN is different from the set corresponding 
to 2 in NZ; moreover, there are true statements which hold in one but not the 
other: for example, 3∈4 is true in <NN, 0, sN>, but not in <NZ, 0, sZ>. Benacerraf’s 
puzzle, as it is called, may be stated simply as “Which is the right identification of 
numbers?” Before continuing let’s address two caveats: the question regarding the 
identification of the natural numbers is not meant to disqualify other possible set-
theoretical candidates, nor to suggest that before the emergence of set theory 
mathematicians failed to refer to numbers. Benacerraf’s puzzle, at least as I read it, 
concerns the referential status of natural numbers as constructed form set-theory, 
or, of any theory which have foundational virtues, taking the ontology of set-
                                                                
13 Paul Benaceraff, “What Numbers Could Not Be,” in Philosophy of Mathematics, eds. Paul 
Benacerraf and Hilary Putnam (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993): 272–295. 
14 Of course, this observation involves a circularity, but the goal of this presentation is not to 
rigorously define and construct the natural number sequence, which can be found in any 
introductory textbook on set theory, only to make intuitive the construction.  
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theory, or of any particular foundational theory, as the ontology of all 
mathematics.  
To what sets do we refer when we speak, in set theoretic terms, about 
natural numbers: to finite von Neumann ordinals, or to Zermelo cardinals? As 
mentioned above, there are no mathematical reasons to distinguish between the 
two constructions, and to propose conventionally adopting one as a solution is 
hilarious.  
McGee takes this referential indeterminacy to be unsolvable, but benign. 
He argues 1) that mathematical reference is scrutable only up to isomorphism and 
2) that the important goal of a mathematical theory is to secure the determinacy of 
the truth values of its sentences, which can be achieved if the theory is 
categorical. And in this respect, McGee argues, we can have determinacy of truth 
value without referential determinacy.  
The difficulty Benacerraf pointed to is a special case of a more general 
phenomenon of inscrutability of reference. [...] For the objects of pure 
mathematics, there are no contingencies and no causal connections; so the 
inscrutability strikes us full force. Inscrutability of reference arises from the fact 
that our thoughts and practices in using mathematical vocabulary are unable to 
discern a preference among isomorphic copies of a mathematical structure.15 
Now, how do we get from categoricity to truth value determinacy? The 
general template of the argument runs through the following lines: if T is a 
categorical theory, then, by proposition 2, T is semantically complete, thus, by the 
definition of semantic completeness, we get that either T⊨ φ or T⊨¬ φ, for all 
sentences φ expressed in T’s language, which means, when unpacked, that either 
φ is true in all models M of T or its negation ¬φ is true in all models M of T, which 
can be taken as an adequate operationalization of the truth value determinacy 
thesis.  
Beyond First Order Logic 
Let’s resume the discussion form the last section. Semantic completeness is an easy 
consequence of categoricity, and is tight with the truth value determinacy thesis 
which constitutes the backbone of semantic realism. The moral is that the 
categoricity of a theory T, or its semantic completeness, can be used as an 
argument in favor of semantic realism, precisely, to argue for the thesis that each 
mathematical sentence couched in the language of T has a determinate truth 
value. So, in order to endorse semantic realism, one should focus its attention to 
                                                                
15 McGee, “How We Learn,” 38.  
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those logical frameworks in which the categoricity of a theory or its semantic 
completeness can be conducted. I will argue that this means moving beyond first 
order logic. As it is well known, the defining properties of first order logic makes 
it an unsuitable candidate for proving the categoricity of theories, at least for 
theories which have a model with an infinite domain. Model theoretic results 
characterizing first order logic tell us that categoricity in first order logic can only 
be obtained for theories with finite models. Suppose that a first order theory T 
expressed in a language with cardinality λ, λ ≥ ℵ0, has an infinite model of 
cardinality κ, κ > λ. The upward Löwenheim–Skolem theorem tells us that T has 
models of every cardinality κ’, κ’≥ κ while the downward Löwenheim–Skolem 
theorem tells us that T has a model of cardinality λ. Consequently, the two 
theorems indicate that such a first order theory T can’t be categorical.  
If first order theories that have infinite models are not categorical, maybe 
we should focus on the semantic completeness of such theories, which can deliver 
the same result, namely, semantic realism. Unfortunately, things don’t look any 
better on this approach either. Although there are several semantically complete 
(but not categorical, as we just saw) first order theories such as the theory of 
discrete linear order with a first and no last point, Presburger Arithmetic16 (P), or 
elementary geometry17, Gödel’s incompleteness theorem assures us that first order 
Peano Arithmetic can’t be among these theories. To be precise, by Gödel’s 
incompleteness theorem there is a sentence G expressed in PA’s language such 
that PA ⊬ G (if P is consistent) and PA ⊬ ¬G, (if PA is ω-consistent); accordingly, 
PA ∪ {G} and PA ∪ {¬G} are consistent, so by the model existence lemma they 
each have a model, let’s say M1 and M2, which, a fortiori, are models of PA. In 
conclusion, PA isn’t categorical nor semantically complete, which means that we 
don’t have reasons to believe that PA has a unique model modulo isomorphism 
nor that the sentences expressed in PA’s language have determinate truth values. 
Now, if there is a mathematical theory for which we have strong intuitions that it 
has a unique model up to isomorphism and that its sentences are determinately 
true or determinately false, that is Peano Arithmetic. So sticking with first order 
logic doesn’t look like viable solution. Before continuing, a caveat should be 
addressed here: of course, we can resort to certain frame first order theories such 
                                                                
16 I will present and discuss Presburger Arithmetic later in the paper. For more details about the 
properties of Presburger Arithmetic see Herbert Enderton, A Mathematical Introduction to 
Logic, second edition (Boston, MA: Academic Press, 2001). 
17 Tarski proved that elementary geometry formulated in first order logic is semantically 
complete and decidable, although not categorical. For more details see Alfred Tarski, Andrzej 
Mostowski, and Raphael Robinson, Undecidable Theories (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1953). 
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as ACA0 or first order set theory in which we can prove the categoricity of PA, but 
the standard argument against it is that this maneuver will push the problem from 
the categoricity of PA to that of the frame first order theories. Being formulated in 
first order logic, these too will have non-isomorphic models, non-standard models, 
and the categoricity of PA proved in these settings only ensures the uniqueness of 
the referential structure of PA within each model of the frame theory, not across 
models. In distinction, in second order logic, it is argued, we have categorical 
characterizations not only of Peano Arithmetic but of endless mathematical 
structures. Let us note, in passing, that Väänänen18 argued that this distinction 
between first order set theory and second order logic is illusory. However, I will 
not engage in this issue here, as my goal is to assess a critique addressed to the full 
open-ended arithmetic as a medium for conducting categoricity proofs.   
Second Order Logic vs Open-Ended Schemas 
By contrasts with first order logic, in full second order logic one can categorically 
characterize Peano Arithmetic without the shortcomings inherent to first order 
settings mentioned and discussed above. But, as often, there is a price to be paid. 
In this case, the price regards the epistemological and ontological status of full 
second order logic and the epistemological significance of a categoricity proof 
conducted in such a system.  
Epistemologically, there are a number of concerns regarding, on the one 
hand, the presuppositions implied by adopting second order logic as the 
framework in which to conduct the proof of the categoricity of Peano Arithmetic, 
and, on the other hand, the significance of a categoricity proof given those 
presuppositions. Full second order logic presupposes that the range of the second 
order quantifiers is constituted by the power set of the domain of the first order 
quantifiers. In our case, the range of second order quantifiers is ℘(ℕ). Now, this 
can be unsettling for three reasons. First, it presupposes that we have an infinitary 
conception of sets of numbers, precisely, of arbitrary infinite sets of numbers 
whose membership relation we can’t specify. Second, as argued by Toby 
Meadows,19 an approach to categoricity via full second order logic presupposes a 
powerful philosophical thesis, the superstructure thesis,20 that each structure has a 
unique superstructure, where the superstructure is formed by taking the set of all 
                                                                
18 Jouko Väänänen, “Second Order Logic, Set Theory and Foundations of Mathematics,” The 
Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 7, 4 (2001): 504–520. 
19 For more details, see Toby Meadows, “What Can a Categoricity Theorem Tell Us?” The 
Review of Symbolic Logic 6 (2013): 524–543.  
20 Meadows, “What Can a Categoricity,” 534–535. 
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collections of the domain and expanding the model accordingly. Thirdly, there are 
all the concerns regarding the determinacy and intelligibility of the powerset 
operation which I will not explore here. All these presuppositions make the 
epistemological significance of categoricity diminish. The belief in the 
superstructure thesis, for example, is philosophically stronger than that of the 
uniqueness of Peano Arithmetic modulo isomorphism, so nothing significant has 
been achieved in this case by providing a categoricity proof. Regarding the first 
presupposition it can be objected that the belief in the uniqueness of Peano 
Arithmetic does not commit one to an infinitary conception of arbitrary sets.   
On the ontological side, an adherent of second order logic seems to be 
committed to the existence of something more than merely the elements of the 
first order domain, namely, to arbitrary sets of such elements, because the range of 
the second order quantifiers is constituted by the powerset of the first order 
domain. In particular, one who adopts PA2, is committed not only to the existence 
of numbers, but of arbitrary sets of numbers, in virtue of the semantics of the 
second order quantifiers. Now, these ontological commitments have been called 
“unsavory” by McGee21 “because they concern entities that are not properly 
speaking part of the subject-matter of the target theory – thus entities which an 
axiomatization of the theory should not commit one to.”22  
This way of determining the ontology of a theory is tributary to Quine’s 
slogan that “to be is to be the value of a bound variable.”23 Of course, this 
ontological criterion is not the only offer on the market, nor is it unanimously 
embraced, but in what follows I will focus on some arguments that rely on this 
criterion.  
In view of all these difficulties raised by the full second order logic, some 
authors24 proposed an alternative in which to conduct categoricity proofs, an 
alternative suspended25 between first and second order logic: the idea is to remain 
                                                                
21 McGee, “How We Learn,” 38. 
22 Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen, and Marcus Rossberg, “Open-Endedness, Schemas and 
Ontological Commitment,” Nous 44 (2010): 331. 
23 Willard van Orman Quine, “On What There Is,” in his From a Logical Point of View, second, 
revised edition (New York and Evanston: Harper Torchbooks, 1963), 15.  
24 I refer here to McGee, “ How We Learn,” Charles Parsons, “The Uniqueness of the Natural 
Numbers,” Iyyun 39 (1990): 13–44, Charles Parsons, Mathematical Thought and its Objects 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), and Shaughan Lavine, Skolem Was Wrong 
(Mansucript, 1999).  
25 To make more suggestive this in-between status of open ended schemas, I’ll index all such 
occurrences with ½, 1 being the index of formulas or sentences for first order logic and 2 for 
second order logic. 
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formally within the bounds of first order logic, but to consider axiom schemas of 
theories as being open-ended, meaning to consider that axiom schemas remain 
valid under arbitrary extensions of a theory’s language.  
Let’s restrict our attention to Peano Arithmetic, and formulate more 
carefully the idea behind open ended schemas in this particular case. The first 
order Peano Arithmetic, PA, has an induction schema: 
(Ind1) (φ(0)∧∀x(φ(x)→φ(s(x))))→∀xφ(x), for all φ(x) ∈ ℒPA. 
which is not a part of ℒPA, but every instance gotten by substituting any open 
sentence of ℒPA for φ(x) is. Now, Kreisel26 pointed out that our belief in Ind1, that 
is, in the validity of the outcome produced by substituting open sentences of ℒPA 
for φ(x), derives from our acceptance of the second order induction axiom:  
(Ind2) ∀X(X0∧∀x(Xx→Xs(x))→∀xXx), for all X ⊆ ℘(ℕ). 
But, as remarked above, the philosophical price for adopting second order 
logic is quite high, devoiding the results that can be obtained in second order logic 
of epistemological value or committing one to ‘unsavory’ ontological entities.  
What McGee, Lavine and Parsons propose is to adopt the following open-
ended schema of induction:27 
(Ind1/2) (φ(0)∧∀x(φ(x)→φ(s(x))))→∀xφ(x), for all φ(x) ∈ ℒ and all ℒ ⊇ ℒPA. 
Various reasons have been advanced in order to support this alternative. 
Just to give an example, McGee28 argues that in a rational reconstruction of how 
we learn mathematical theories, an essential step is precisely mastering the 
functioning of open ended schemas, so, in learning arithmetic, we basically learn 
(Ind1/2). I will not present and examine all these arguments here, but focus on one 
reason that McGee stresses: that resorting to open ended schemas, among other 
philosophical benefits, purges the unsavory ontological commitments of second 
order logic retaining its strengths. Now, let’s see how this maneuver retains the 
relevant properties of full second order logic that allow us to establish the 
categoricity of Peano Arithmetic.  
In order to show this we have to clarify what extensions of ℒPA are 
admissible. Briefly, the legitimate extensions of ℒPA are those that are formed by 
                                                                
26 Kreisel, “Informal Rigor.” 
27 Remember that the only significant change between PA and PA2 is the induction axiom and 
the semantics that accompanies it. 
28 McGee, “How We Learn.” 
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the introduction of a name or a constant denoting any individual from the 
domain, or by the introduction of predicates such that for any collection C of 
individuals from the domain, there is a predicate that is true of C, or it is involved 
in the construction of an open sentence satisfied by exactly the members of C. A 
passage from McGee’s article “How We Learn Mathematical languages” is 
particularly illuminating in this respect:  
To say what individuals and classes of individuals the rules of our language 
permit us to name is easy: we are permitted to name anything at all. For any 
collection of individuals K there is a logically possible world - though perhaps 
not a theologically possible world - in which our practices in using English are 
just what they are in the actual world and in which K is the extension of the 
open sentence 'x is blessed by God.' So the rules of our language permit the 
language to contain an open sentence whose extension is K. Moreover, the rules 
ensure that a true sentence would be obtained if such an open sentence were 
substituted into the Induction Axiom Schema, so they ensure that, if K contains 
any natural numbers at all, it contains a least natural number. This holds for any 
collection K whatever, whether or not we are psychologically capable of 
distinguishing the K’s from the non-K’s.29 
Following Pedersen and Rossberg I will operationalize the above remarks in 
what they call McGee’s rule: 
Consider a theory T formulated in a language L with at least one open-ended 
schema. 
Then: 
(1) Any individual is nameable. If, for a given individual, L does not already 
contain a name for it, such a name can be added to L. 
(2) Any collection of individuals C is nameable, in the sense that, if L does not 
already contain an open sentence φ which holds exactly of the members of C, 
predicates (or other expressions) can be added to L that allow formulating a 
sentence that holds exactly of the members of C.30 
This rule coupled with (Ind1/2) is logically as powerful as (Ind2) in the 
setting of full second order logic. Any set S that is in the range of the second order 
quantifiers can be named in an extension of ℒPA by an open sentence, and 
substituted for φ(x) in (Ind1/2) in order to obtain a first order instance. This 
equivalence between the semantic values of second order quantifiers and the 
semantic values of predicates or open sentences in arbitrary extensions of ℒPA is 
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sufficient to ensure the provability of the categoricity of Peano Arithmetic. Just 
consider the second order formula:  
σ(x): ∀X((X0 ∧∀y(Xy→Xs(y)))→Xx) 
Intuitively, this formula expresses the property of having all the hereditary 
properties of 0. By the comprehension schema of full second order logic there is a 
set which is the extension of this formula, so such a set is in the range of the 
second order quantifier. Applying (Ind2) to the formula σ(x) we get (σ(0) 
∧∀y(σ(y)→σ(s(y))))→∀xσ(x); proving the antecedent, which is fairly 
straightforward, yields PA2 ⊢∀xσ(x), from which, assuming soundness, we can 
infer PA2 ⊨∀xσ(x), that basically says that in every model of PA2 every element 
in the domain is 0 or one of its (finitely) successors. With this result established, 
categoricity falls shortly, all that remains to be proved is that any two such models 
of PA2 are isomorphic, which can be easily established.  
Now, the equivalence between the semantic values of second order 
quantifiers and the semantic values of predicates or open sentences in arbitrary 
extensions of ℒPA assures us that there is an open formula σ'(x) or a predicate 
letter with precisely the same extension as σ(x), which, of course, is subject to 
(Ind1/2). The above argument can now be reproduced and, thus, the categoricity of 
open-ended arithmetic established. This is the basic argument that open-ended 
arithmetic is categorical. 
Open-Ended Schemas and Ontological Commitment 
McGee argues that one of the advantages of adopting open-ended arithmetic is 
represented by its ontological parsimony. Let’s sketch McGee’s argument for this. 
We have mentioned that the active criterion employed in characterizing the 
ontology of a theory based on the range of its quantifiers is that proposed and 
advocated by Quine, that to be is to be the value of a bound variable. On a literal 
reading of this slogan, the open-ended arithmetic seems to be, ontologically, on a 
par with first order logic, for its quantifiers are first order. Every instance of 
(Ind1/2) is first order, so open-ended arithmetic is committed to the existence of 
numbers, as revealed by the presence of its first order quantifiers, and is not 
committed to the existence of sets of numbers as revealed by the absence of 
second order quantifiers. This, in a nutshell is the gist of McGee’s argument that 
open-ended schema arithmetic is “metaphysically benign.”31 
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Let us note that although open-ended arithmetic is ontologically as 
innocent as first order logic, in terms of characterizing the structure of the natural 
numbers is as powerful as second order logic.  
Now, this package consisting of open-ended schemas coupled with McGee’s 
rule may be seen as a cheat not only in establishing categoricity but also as a 
maneuver of avoiding the unsavory ontological commitments of second order 
logic. And, indeed, it was criticized on both accounts. Hartry Field32 criticized this 
approach in delivering categoricity results, insisting that it is at best question 
begging and has nothing to do with open-ended schemas and everything to do 
with the admissibility of new predicates with already determined extensions. 
Pedersen and Rossberg criticized it as a cheat for it presupposes a narrow reading 
of Quine’s ontological criterion. In what follows I will concentrate on this second 
critique.  
What Pedersen and Rossberg rightly observed is that the second order 
universal quantifier present in (Ind2) gained one level, so to speak, thus appearing 
in (Ind1/2) as the qualification that we have to take into consideration all (possible) 
extensions ℒ of ℒPA, more precisely (focusing on McGee’s rule), that we can 
introduce predicates or open sentences and constants for all individuals and 
collections of individuals that constitutes the first order domain. So, the second 
order quantifiers disappears from the object theory, thus relieving it from the 
unsavory ontological burden, and emerges with basically the same function in the 
meta-theory, this time, seemingly, with no ontological effects at all. It is this 
observation that motivates Pedersen and Rossberg in amending Quine’s criterion 
in order to account for this type of maneuvers.  
What they propose is not a renunciation to the ontological criterion of 
Quine, but a modification of it so that, for some particular contexts, the first level 
ontological commitments of a theory, represented by the range of the theory’s 
quantifiers, have to be coupled with the second level ontological commitments 
implied in the meta-theoretical principles that construe the theory. Well, the big 
question is to specify the cases in which we have to combine the two levels of 
ontological commitments. Although the authors admit that this is a “delicate and 
difficult issue”33 they present a landmark that signals when the modified criterion 
has to be deployed: the modified criterion becomes active in all the cases where 
the meta-theoretical principles are indispensible for construing the theory in a 
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certain way, in order to achieve a goal. Let’s synthesize their proposal in the 
following manner: 
Pedersen & Rossberg’s ontological criterion (PROC): The ontological 
commitments of a theory T consists of the values of the bound variables of T 
together with the values of the bound variables of the metal-theoretical 
principles used for construing T in a certain specific way.  
Armed with this modified criterion we can see that open-ended arithmetic 
fails to be as ontologically parsimonious as first order arithmetic is; in fact, 
applying Pedersen & Rossberg’s criterion equates the ontological commitments of 
open-ended arithmetic with those of second order arithmetic. The reason should 
be clear: as we have seen, McGee’s meta-theoretical rule is indispensable in order 
to construe Peano Arithmetic as categorical and, thus, establishing the thesis of 
truth-value determinacy. As Hartry Field remarked,34 McGee’s rule is where the 
magic of the open-ended arithmetic lies, not (Ind1/2), and, as shown in the 
previous section, the rule is needed in order to prove the categoricity which, 
further, is used for establishing the truth-value determinacy of arithmetical 
statements.  
So, if the rule is used for construing the theory in this particular way 
(categoricity plus truth-value determinacy), then the bounded variables specified 
in the rule contribute to the theory’s ontology, thus leading to the nasty 
repercussion for the aficionados of open-ended arithmetic that its ontology is 
equivalent to that of second order arithmetic (in virtue of the equivalence 
between the semantic values of the second order quantifiers and the semantic 
values of the predicates and open sentences of all the admissible extensions of 
ℒPA). This should be a fairly accurate gloss of Pederson and Rossberg: 
Applying the modified criterion of ontological commitment, McGee’s Rule is 
thus ontologically committing when open-ended arithmetic is thought of as a 
categorical theory with certain philosophical ramifications – which is exactly the 
way it is thought of when compared to second order arithmetic. Open-ended 
arithmetic – regarded in the manner indicated – is therefore not just committed 
to the numbers that serve as the values of the bound variables of the theory itself, 
but likewise to classes of these – indeed, to a class for any combination of 
numbers. Why? Because McGee’s Rule involves a quantifier that ranges over 
arbitrary collections of the first-order domain: any collection of members of the 
first-order domain can be named.35 
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Critiquing the Critique 
In this section I will assess the critique of Pedersen and Rossberg regarding the 
ontological commitments of open-ended arithmetic, precisely, I will argue not 
only that their revised ontological criterion delivers counterintuitive results in 
certain widely accepted cases of first order theories, but that it assigns a certain 
type of ontology to a theory, and a different, richer, ontology to one of its sub-
theories, making their proposal highly problematic. This doesn’t mean that I 
endorse McGee’s argument for the ontological parsimony of open-ended 
arithmetic over second order arithmetic, nor do I think that resorting to open-
ended arithmetic is genuinely a valid maneuver for establishing categoricity.  
Let’s start by analyzing the modified ontological criterion (PROC). A first 
observation is that there seems to be an ambiguity in what the construal of the 
theory means. In our specific case, it seems that the construal of open-ended 
arithmetic means establishing categoricity and, as a philosophical consequence, 
the truth-value determinacy of its statements. But, McGee’s rule, properly 
speaking, allows establishing the categoricity of arithmetic not the truth-value 
determinacy of its sentences, and it is debatable whether the latter follows from 
the former. So, in a sense, the construal forced by McGee’s rule covers only 
categoricity, not truth-value determinacy. But let’s concede that the proper 
construal of open-ended arithmetic involves the whole package, categoricity plus 
truth value determinacy. If this is the case, then my contention is that PROC is 
too philosophically sensible to be employed as a tool of discerning the ontology of 
a theory. Suppose that some authors deny that the categoricity of a theory has as a 
“philosophical corollary”36 the truth value determinacy thesis. In fact, as Pedersen 
and Rossberg mention,37 Hartry Field is one of them. For these authors, McGee’s 
rule does not enforce the truth value determinacy thesis based on categoricity. 
Then, is it the case that for authors like Hartry Field open-ended arithmetic has a 
first order ontology? Somehow, in order to determine the ontology of a theory we 
are supposed to recognize and agree that the theory was construed in a certain 
manner, for example to be categorical and characterized by the determinacy of the 
truth values of its sentences. The problem, in our case study, is that the connection 
between the two constitutive items of the construal of open-ended arithmetic is 
not straightforward or transparent, leaving room for disagreement between the 
philosophical goal and the meta-theoretical property (categoricity, in this case) 
that supposedly delivers the goal. Surely, an easy answer would be to argue that 
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what matters is not how a person views the relation between the goal and the 
meta-theoretic property, but that the theory was construed in a specific manner in 
order to achieve a certain goal whether one agrees that it accomplish the intended 
goal or not. But this presupposes that establishing the ontology of a theory 
requires the ability to discern the indirect goals behind the formulation of certain 
meta-theoretical principles. So, prior to establishing the ontology of a theory we 
have to discern what goals motivate the particular formulation of certain 
principles. But this requirement faces two difficulties. First, the goals aren’t 
necessarily grasped form the formulation of the principles, so that one who is not 
aware of the intention with which the meta-theoretic principles were formulated 
may attribute a different ontology than one who is. Secondly, one can find 
numerous compatible goals with the formulation in a certain manner of some 
meta-theoretical principles, thus expanding the ontology even of theories with 
widely recognized first-order type ontology.  
Now, even if we grant, for the sake of argument, that the relation between 
the meta-theoretic property and the intended goal that it serves is not 
philosophically obscure, equivocal, or sensible, so that the connection is, to a 
functional degree, unproblematic, there is another objection that can be raised 
against PROC. The objection is that certain first order theories that have a first 
order ontology, by PROC’s standards, have sub-theories with a second order 
ontology, according to the same ontological criterion, i.e. PROC. In the remainder 
of this paper I will develop such an example.  
Presburger Arithmetic, P, is the sub-theory of PA from which we expelled 
the axioms governing the behavior of multiplication. Precisely, P is defined by the 
following axioms: 
(i) ∀x ¬(0 = s(x))   
(ii) ∀x∀y ((s(x) = s(y))→(x = y)) 
(iii) ∀x(x + 0 = x) 
(iv) ∀x∀y ((x + s(y) = s(x + y)) 
plus the axiom schema for induction: 
(v) (IndP) (φ(0)∧∀x(φ(x)→φ(s(x))))→∀xφ(x), for all φ(x) ∈ ℒP. 
Let’s mention, without giving a proof38, a remarkable property of 
Presburger Arithmetic, namely, that it is semantically complete. 
                                                                




Now, focusing on the induction axiom (IndP), let’s note that based on the 
way it is formulated, one can associated with it a meta-theoretic rule, call it MTR, 
that, as I will argue bellow, has an indispensable role in proving the semantic 
completeness of the theory from which the same old truth-value determinacy 
thesis follows.  
 
MTR:  
Consider a theory T formulated in a language L with at least one axiom schema. 
Then: 
Certain sets of numbers are nameable, precisely those sets whose members satisfy 
an open sentence of T. For every open sentence φ(x) of L there is a set S such that 
φ(x) holds exactly of the members of S.  
We can see that, mirroring the formulation of McGee’s rule, MTR just 
explicitly states what is involved in the appendix ‘for all φ(x) ∈ ℒP’, or, for that 
matter, in any appendices of first order axiom schemas.  
As in the case of (Ind1/2) and McGee’s rule, the power of (IndP) lies in MTR. 
Without MTR, (IndP) has no real teeth, so, without MTR, (IndP) is useless, and P is 
reduced to the four axioms i) – iv) which constitutes a sub-theory of P, let’s call it 
O. In other words, dropping MTR amounts to a renunciation of (IndP), thus 
leaving us with O. It can be proved, by a simple model-theoretic argument, that O 
is not semantically complete. In fact, one can build models of O in which intuitive 
true statements in the standard model of Peano Arithmetic, like ∀x(0 + x = x), and  
∀x¬(s(x) = x) are false. Take the statement ∀x¬(s(x) = x). In the standard model of 
Peano Arithmetic, this statement is true, so in the standard model of O, OS this 
statement is also true, OS ⊨ ∀x¬(s(x)=x). Let’s construct a model O* of O by 
inserting into the standard model an element a, which is its self successor, i.e.  
(s(a) = a) and define addition +* in the following manner:  
 
 
As one can verify, in this model all the axioms of O are true, yet ∀x¬(s(x)=x) 
is false, as witnessed by a, so O* ⊨ ¬(∀x¬(s(x) = x)). As a consequence, O is not 
semantically complete. So, dropping MTR amounts to dropping (IndP) which, as 
we have seen, has the consequence that the remaining theory O defined by axioms 
i) – iv) minus (IndP) is not semantically complete.  
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The above argument shows that the MTR rule is essential in construing P as 
semantically complete, which means that P is subject to PROC, so one is right to 
claim that P is ontologically committed to the existence of certain sets of numbers, 
namely to those sets that are the semantic values of the open sentences of P. 
Technically, the quantifier present in MTR commits P to the existence of sets of 
numbers, so the ontology of P is second order. Thus, applying PROC to P gives us 
the odd result that Presburger Arithmetic has a mixed ontology, composed of 
numbers and sets of numbers, basically, a second order ontology, parsimonious to 
be fair, but, nevertheless, second order. Of course, this goes against the widely 
accepted first order ontology of this theory. More importantly, applying PROC to 
PA gives the result that PA has a first order ontology, yet, based on the same 
criterion, a sub-theory of PA, namely P, has a parsimonious second order 
ontology. I take the result that PA has a first order ontology, corroborated by the 
universal consensus,39 to mean that P, as a sub-theory of PA, has to have a first 
order type of ontology. Yet, on this issue, PROC says something else, that P has a 
second order ontology. What credibility an ontological criterion has, if it assigns a 
certain type of ontology to a theory, and a different, richer, ontology to one of its 
sub-theories? The fact that PROC delivers such weird, if not inconsistent, results 
seems to me to be a sign that it simply does not work as an adequate and 
functional ontological criterion.   
Let’s address another possible objection that may be raised against the 
argument developed so far. Maybe PROC is applicable only for those theories 
lacking a meta-theoretic property such as categoricity or semantic completeness, 
and for which a meta-theoretic principle is summoned in order for the theory to 
acquire a certain meta-theoretic property. This objection can be counter by 
observing that a change in MTR affects the meta-theoretic properties of P: for 
example, if we restrict MTR to a certain specific set of open sentences φ(x) of L, 
such as the Δ0 set of formulas of ℒP, then P is no longer semantically complete. 
Consider the theory PΔ0:  
(i) ∀x ¬(0 = s(x)) 
(ii) ∀x ∀y ((s(x) = s(y)) → (x = y)) 
(iii) ∀x ((x + 0) = x) 
(iv ) ∀x ∀y ((x + s(y)) = s(x + y)) 
and  
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(v) (IndΔ0): (φ(0) ∧ ∀x(φ(x) → φ(s(x))) → ∀x(φ(x)), for all φ(x) ∈ Δ0 or for some 
suitable specified subset of formulas of ℒP. 
Claim: PΔ0 is incomplete.  
Argument: It is not hard to see that the sentence U = ∀x(¬(x = 0) → ∃y(x = 
s(y))) is not derivable in PΔ0, and not difficult to construct models Mi and Mj such 
that Mi ╞ U and Mj ╞ ¬U. 
Now, in order to make PΔ0 semantically complete, we can lift the 
restriction of considering only Δ0 open formulas as being amenable to induction 
and let the whole set of open formulas of ℒP be subjected to the rule of induction, 
thus adopting a full-fledged MTR. The resulting theory will be semantically 
complete, because of the adoption of this full-fledged MTR, so again PROC will be 
applicable to this particular example, delivering the same inconsistent results.   
As I have mentioned, this critique of PROC is not meant to be an 
endorsement of McGee’s philosophical position on open ended arithmetic, which, 
for reasons that I will not explore here, I think is highly problematic too. The 
whole point of this section was to argue that Pederson and Rossberg’s proposal to 
modify Quine’s ontological criterion, although justly motivated, leads to some 
counterintuitive and hard to accept results regarding the widely accepted ontology 
of some simple arithmetic theories.40 
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